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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint: i f ! / Appo I lee, 
v. 
MICHAEL SQUIRE, 
De fendant / Appe11ant 
Case No, 9 3 074 6-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Michael Squire appeals from his convict ion I or 
distributic • anr-e in violation of Utah Code 
i. - ,i. (Supp. 1993 -, -i v ^ degree felony. 
This Court :o^ jurisdiction pursuant • t Ann, u H 2a-
3 ( 2 j v - • ) • 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did + \'- * " ,- -~ ::- r * * - - at — r~ 
examin- , prior convicticv roi attempted 
distribute, .; .i rolled substanc- v '?p defend? 
his entrapment defense . < .> - • . : 
drug dealer? - . . C...,LK;S che determination of 
whether the trial court properly permitted • - inquiry int.«u I he-
prior convict. r therefore - I: n al court' s 
ru.l.inq .;.: otate v. Jaime2 822, 826 (Utah 
App. 1991) . •-•• defendar: ;-i uiie ux >" LIT", int:i« any 
error that may have resu": ing =md therefore cannot 
rely H I II . i.y d basis for reversal. State v. Dunn, 850 I-.*d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error"). 
2. Did the trial court properly refuse to give defendant's 
proposed entrapment instructions even though the court accurately 
instructed the jury on the elements of entrapment? A trial 
court's decision not to give a requested jury instruction 
presents a question of law reviewed for correctness; however, the 
trial court has discretion to select between accurate, but 
different instructions. State v. Gallecros, 849 P.2d 586, 588 
(Utah App. 1993) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with distribution of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1993) (R. 1). At the conclusion of a 
one-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of the crime 
charged (R. 89, Tr. June 23, 19931 at 317-19) . The trial court 
sentenced defendant to the statutory prison term of 0-5 years, 
ordered defendant to pay a $5,000 fine, and ordered defendant to 
pay restitution of $50 (R. 111-12). The trial court suspended 
execution of the sentence and placed defendant on 24 months 
1
 The trial transcript was not separately numbered for the 
appellate record. All further references to the trial transcript 
will be identified as ffTr.,f 
2 
probation, requiring defendant to comply with certain terms and 
conditions of probation (R. 112). Defendant timely filed his 
notice of appeal on November 24, 1993 (R. 116). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January 1992, Brian Barson moved to Sanpete County to 
attend school and to begin undercover narcotics work (Tr. 90-91, 
121). The local narcotics officer, John Cox, instructed Mr. 
Barson to develop sources for drug buys, but did not identify any 
particular suspects, including defendant, for Mr. Barson to 
pursue (Tr. 93-94, 134-35, 171). 
Sometime after Mr. Barson began his work, he attended a 
party where he participated in a conversation about drugs (Tr. 
97-98). Defendant eventually joined the conversation and 
volunteered to procure marijuana for Mr. Barson (Tr. 97-98, 141). 
Defendant indicated that he thought he could procure a quarter of 
an ounce for approximately $50 (Tr. 99-100). Mr. Barson accepted 
defendant's invitation and agreed to meet defendant at a third 
person's home on April 18, 1992 to give defendant the money for 
the marijuana and to arrange a time when defendant would turn it 
over to Mr. Barson (Tr. 98-104, 107-109). 
After obtaining the money from Mr. Barson on April 18th, 
defendant went to Salt Lake City on the 19th to procure the 
marijuana (Tr. 282). When defendant returned that evening, he 
met Mr. Barson and gave Mr. Barson the marijuana (Tr. 109, 112-
14). Mr. Barson wore "wires" to both the April 18th and 19th 
meetings, and Officer Cox monitored and recorded both 
3 
conversations (Tr. 103-104, 110, 174). The tape recordings were 
played for the jury (Tr. 182-88, 188-92). 
During the conversation on April 19th when defendant 
delivered the marijuana to Mr. Barson, defendant boasted to Mr. 
Barson about the quality of the marijuana, stated that he got a 
good deal for $50, asked Mr. Barson to give him a "bowl" out of 
the marijuana for getting it, joked with Mr. Barson about not 
smoking it without him, said he needed to get more, and said that 
he could get more at any time (Tr. 189-192). On cross-
examination, defendant described his statement that "[t]his is 
good F'in Bud" as a "sales pitch" (Tr. 286). (Tr. 189-92 & 286 
are attached as addendum B.) 
Additional facts are recited in the argument sections to 
which they are relevant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Cross-examination on prior conviction. The trial court 
properly allowed the State to cross-examine defendant about his 
prior conviction for attempted distribution. First, subsection 6 
to § 76-2-303 only prohibits the State from introducing evidence 
of prior convictions in its case in chief to show defendant's 
predisposition to sell drugs; it does not preclude the use of 
that evidence to address issues raised by defendant. Second, 
even if the trial court did err by admitting the evidence, 
defendant led the court into that error and therefore cannot rely 
on it as a basis for reversal. Finally, this court may affirm 
the trial court's decision on the alternative basis that the 
4 
evidence of defendant's prior conviction was admissible to attack 
his credibility. 
2. Jury instructions. The trial court properly instructed 
the jury on defendant's entrapment defense; therefore, the trial 
court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instructions does 
not constitute an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. 
Alternatively, even if it would have been appropriate for the 
trial court to include in its instructions language requiring the 
jury to consider whether defendant sold Mr. Barson drugs as a 
result of defendant's own initiative or desire, the failure to do 
so did not affect the outcome in this case. The evidence 
precluded any reasonable likelihood that the jury would have 
believed that Mr. Barson's conduct induced defendant to sell him 
marijuana. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE STATE TO CROSS-
EXAMINE DEFENDANT ABOUT HIS PRIOR CONVICTION FOR 
ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT HE WAS NOT A 
DRUG DEALER AND THAT HE NO LONGER USED MARIJUANA 
Defendant supported his defense in part by offering evidence 
of his good character. Through his own testimony, the testimony 
of his witnesses, and his counsel's statements to the jury, 
defendant repeatedly asserted that he no longer used marijuana 
and denied that he had been a drug dealer or had ever sold drugs 
prior to this transaction (Tr. 80, 85-87, 230, 233-35, 252-53, 
261-62, 269). 
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In support of his claim that he no longer used marijuana, 
defendant volunteered that he had frequent urine drug screens 
that always came back negative (Tr. 261). When the prosecutor 
began to question defendant about why he was having the drug 
screens, defendant's counsel asked to discuss the line of 
questioning outside the jury's presence (Tr. 269-70). 
Defendant's counsel then objected to allowing the State to cross-
examine defendant about his previous guilty plea to a charge of 
attempted distribution -- the drug screens were a condition of 
probation for the prior conviction -- arguing that subsection 6 
of § 76-2-303 precluded admission of that evidence.2 The State 
responded that it was entitled to introduce the evidence because 
defendant had opened the door by testifying about the urine drug 
screens, and because it was admissible under State v. Hansen, 588 
P.2d 164 (Utah 1978) to rebut defendant's entrapment evidence. 
The trial court allowed the State to question defendant about the 
prior offense, relying on both bases argued by the State. (Tr. 
270-77.) (Transcript pages 270-77 are attached as addendum C.) 
2
 Subsection 6 reads as follows: 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury 
where the defense of entrapment is an issue, 
past offenses of the defendant shall not be 
admitted except that in a trial where the 
defendant testifies he may be asked of his 
past convictions for felonies and any 
testimony given by the defendant at a hearing 
on entrapment may be used to impeach his 
testimony at trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(6) (1990). 
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A. The trial court properly allowed the State to cross-
examine defendant about his prior conviction for 
attempted distribution of a controlled substance to 
rebut evidence defendant introduced in support of his 
entrapment defense. 
In Utah, "[ejntrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer 
or a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer 
induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence 
of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1990). 
This definition requires applying an objective standard in 
determining the validity of an entrapment defense. State v. 
Tavlor, 599 P.2d 496, 499-503 (Utah 1979). The defendant's 
predisposition to commit the crime, a relevant consideration 
under the rejected subjective standard, has no relevance to this 
inquiry; therefore, subsection 6 precludes the use of prior 
offenses to avoid consideration of a defendant's predisposition. 
Id. at 503. 
However, subsection 6 does not raise an absolute bar to 
introducing evidence of prior convictions. In State v. Hansen, 
588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction because the State introduced evidence of 
his other wrongs in its case in chief. Id. at 166-67. However, 
the court went on to state that once defendant had introduced the 
issue of entrapment, subsection 6 did not preclude the State from 
introducing any evidence necessary to address that issue. 
Although Hansen preceded Taylor and presumed a subjective inquiry 
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in considering an entrapment defense, the fundamental reasoning 
of Hansen still controls: once a defendant introduces an issue 
into the trial, subsection 6 does not operate to preclude the 
State from introducing evidence of prior convictions to address 
it. 
In this case, subsection 6 precluded the State from using 
defendant's prior conviction for attempted distribution in its 
case in chief to establish his predisposition to sell drugs. 
However, once defendant introduced the issues of his urine drug 
screens and his prior drug sales, he could not cry foul when the 
State sought to explain and rebut his evidence, and subsection 6 
does not require a different result. See also State v. Green, 
578 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1978) (if a defendant "offers himself as 
a witness, he then becomes subject to being treated the same as 
any other witness," which includes being cross-examined on 
anything that "would tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt 
upon the credibility of his testimony"). Therefore, the trial 
court properly allowed the State to cross-examine defendant about 
his prior conviction. 
Moreover, even if this court finds that the trial court 
erroneously permitted the cross-examination, defendant invited 
that error and therefore cannot rely on it as a basis for 
reversal. Although § 76-2-303 would normally preclude inquiry 
into defendant's predisposition to sell drugs, defendant, not the 
State, introduced the issue of his predisposition to sell drugs. 
By supporting his entrapment defense with testimony that he no 
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longer used marijuana and that he was not and never had been a 
drug dealer, defendant invoked the subjective entrapment standard 
by asserting, in effect, that he had no predisposition to sell 
the marijuana he sold to Mr. Barson. He only sought the 
protection of the objective test for entrapment when it would 
have prevented the State from rebutting his predisposition 
evidence. Section 76-2-303 directs the fact finder's attention 
away from a defendant's predisposition to commit the crime 
However, where a defendant introduces evidence of his lack of 
predisposition, § 76-2-303 does not preclude the State from 
rebutting that evidence. Because defendant created any error in 
the first place, he cannot rely on it as a basis for reversal. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing that error"); State v. Barney, 
681 P.2d 1230, 1231 n.3 (Utah 1984) (the defendant cannot 
complain about evidence of his prior bad acts elicited by his own 
counsel's cross-examination of the State's witness) (citing State 
v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978)). 
B. Alternatively, the trial court properly permitted the 
State to cross-examine defendant about his prior 
conviction in order to attack his credibility. 
Finally, an alternative basis exists for upholding the trial 
court's decision on this issue: the trial court properly allowed 
the State to cross-examine defendant about his prior conviction 
9 
to attack his credibility.3 State v. Reed, 820 P. 2d 479 (Utah 
App. 1991). At the same time defendant presented evidence of his 
good character to support his entrapment defense, he attacked the 
character of the State's witnesses. Defendant claimed that Mr. 
Barson frequently used marijuana and drank heavily at the parties 
they attended (Tr. 220-21, 225, 227-28, 243-46), and that both 
Officer Cox and Mr. Barson singled him out for investigation 
because they had individual, personal grudges against him (Tr. 
80-82, 83-85, 206-13, 258-61, 262-64). 
In addition to his character evidence, defendant supported 
his entrapment defense by claiming that Mr. Barson repeatedly and 
incessantly requested that he acquire drugs for him and even 
asked defendant's friends to prevail upon defendant to do so (Tr. 
85-87, 221-30, 233-35, 241-49, 252-53, 261, 265-68). Defendant 
specifically denied ever offering to sell marijuana to Mr. Barson 
(Tr. 266-68). The State's evidence contradicted defendant's. 
Mr. Barson testified that defendant solicited the sale, not the 
other way around (Tr. 97-98, 141). Both Mr. Barson and Officer 
Cox denied that they held grudges against defendant or that they 
had singled him out for investigation (Tr. 93-94, 126-32, 133-35, 
141, 170-71, 202). 
In State v. Reed, as in this case, the defendant's evidence 
directly contradicted the State's, the defendant attacked the 
3
 Although the trial court did not rely on this basis for 
admitting the testimony, this court "may affirm the trial court's 
decision to admit evidence on any proper grounds, even though the 
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. 
Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). 
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character of the State's witness while presenting his character 
in a favorable light, and the defendant denied using drugs. Id. 
at 481. On appeal, this court upheld the trial court's decision 
to introduce testimony that police found drug paraphernalia in 
the defendant's apartment because it impeached defendant's 
credibility. IdL at 482.4 
Similarly, defendant in this case offered evidence of his 
good character to support his defense, repeatedly asserting both 
that he did not use marijuana and that he had never been a drug 
dealer. Having done so, he cannot complain because the trial 
court allowed the State to cross-examine him about his prior 
conviction for attempted distribution in order to rebut the 
credibility of his character evidence. Id. at 481-82. See also 
State v. Green, 578 P.2d at 513-14 (in a prosecution on two 
charges of selling narcotics, testimony about defendant selling 
drugs on occasions other than those charged was properly 
admissible where defendant claimed he was not a drug dealer). 
Additionally, defendant's evidence directly contradicted the 
State's. Therefore, credibility became a crucial issue, and the 
State was entitled to introduce evidence suggesting that 
defendant had lied about his prior dealings in drugs in order to 
4
 This court also rejected the defendant's claim that the 
trial court should have excluded the evidence under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, holding that "[i]t would be a mockery of our 
justice system to allow a defendant to take the stand and testify 
as to his own good character while impugning the character of an 
opposing witness, and then claim that his testimony is not subject 
to cross-examination because such inquiry would be too 
prejudicial." Id. 
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attack his credibility generally. State v. Reed, 820 P.2d at 
481-82. 
The record clearly establishes that the State used 
defendant's conviction for no other purpose than to attack the 
credibility of his statement that he was not a drug dealer. 
After cross-examining defendant about his prior conviction, the 
State made only one other reference to it. In his closing 
argument, the prosecutor made the following comment: 
"[Defendant] says he's not a drug dealer. He has a conviction, a 
drug conviction, besides the one we're here dealing on today" 
(Tr. 301). Subsection 6 of § 76-2-303 does not preclude cross-
examining defendant about his prior convictions in order to 
attack his credibility. The subsection's purpose is to preclude 
offering evidence of predisposition. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 
at 503. Allowing evidence of prior convictions to attack 
credibility does not thwart that purpose, and the State used 
defendant's prior conviction only to attack his credibility. 
For all of the reasons stated above, the trial court 
properly permitted the State to cross-examine defendant about his 
prior conviction. In any event, even if the trial court erred, 
defendant created the error and therefore cannot rely on it as a 
basis for reversal. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRAPMENT INSTRUCTION PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE; 
THEREFORE, THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS. 
A trial court's decision not to give a requested jury 
instruction presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Galleaos, 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993). However, 
the trial court has discretion to select between accurate, but 
different instructions. Id. Defendant has not shown that the 
trial court committed reversible error by rejecting his proposed 
instructions. 
A. Defendant has preserved his appellate claim only as to 
his proposed instruction nos. 4 and 7. 
At the outset, it is necessary to define the scope of the 
claim defendant has preserved for appeal.5 Defendant originally 
submitted ten proposed entrapment instructions. However, when 
the court and counsel discussed the instructions, defendant 
specifically stated only that the trial court should give his 
instruction nos. 4 and 7,6 and that he did not have any other 
objections to the instructions. Therefore, defendant waived any 
challenge that the failure to give the other eight instructions 
was error. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) 
5
 On appeal, defendant has not identified with specificity 
which of his proposed jury instructions he claims the trial court 
should have given. He only identifies the general substance of 
what he believes the instructions should have included. 
6
 It is not clear whether defendant wanted these instructions 
given in addition to or instead of the trial court's entrapment 
instruction. 
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(where counsel read and affirmatively represented that she had no 
objection to a proposed jury instruction, defendant had 
affirmatively waived any challenge to that instruction, even 
under a manifest injustice analysis). 
B* The trial court's entrapment instruction accurately 
defined the defense for the jury. 
The trial court's entrapment instruction repeated the 
statutory definition of that defense (R. 67) .7 Therefore, the 
trial court accurately instructed the jury on defendant's theory 
of the case. State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 748-49 (Utah 1984) 
("[t]his Court has approved giving the statutory definition of 
entrapment to the jury") (dicta, citation omitted). 
Because the trial court accurately instructed the jury, it 
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give defendant's 
requested instructions.8 State v. Gallecros. 849 P.2d 586, 590 
7
 The court's instruction reads as follows: 
You are hereby instructed that it is a defense that 
the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or 
person directed by or acting in cooperation with the 
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit 
it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
The defense is available even though the actor 
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute 
the offense 
(R. 67). 
Defendant's proposed instruction no. 4 reads as follows: 
If you find that there is reasonable doubt as to 
whether the offense committed was the product of Michael 
14 
(Utah App. 1993) ("Our inquiry therefore must center on the jury 
instruction actually used and determine whether it accurately 
states the law. So long as the jury instruction used was 
accurate, it was not error for the trial court to refuse a 
different instruction that was also accurate."). This court need 
not even consider whether defendant's proposed instructions were 
accurate or even preferable to the one given. State v. Pedersen, 
802 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 
241 (Utah 1991). Therefore, defendant has not and cannot 
establish that the refusal to give his proposed instructions 
constituted an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.9 
C. The trial court's refusal to include in its 
instructions what defendant claims on appeal it should 
have did not affect the outcome. 
Squire's initiative and desire then you must find Michael 
Squire not guilty of the offense of distribution of a 
controlled substance 
(R. 27). His proposed instruction no. 7 reads as follows: 
In evaluation [sic] the course of conduct between 
the government representative and Michael Squire, the 
transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction 
between the agent and Michael Squire, and the respoonse 
[sic] to the inducements or persuasion of the police 
agent are all to be considered in judging what the effect 
of the governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal 
person 
(R. 30). 
9
 Although the State maintains that defendant has only 
preserved this claim with respect to his proposed instructions 4 
and 7, the State's argument on the merits would dispose of any 
claim based on the failure to give any of defendant's other eight 
proposed instructions. That is, the trial court accurately 
instructed the jury on defendant's entrapment defense; therefore, 
it did not err by not giving any of defendant's proposed 
instructions. 
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On appeal, defendant claims that the "jury should have been 
instructed upon the issue of reasonable doubt as to whether the 
crime committed was a product of the defendant's own initiative 
and desire or the persistent efforts of the police authority to 
induce him or create a substantial risk that he would commit the 
crime with which the state would charge him." Appellant's Brief 
at 13 (emphasis added). Even if these consideration would have 
been appropriate, the failure to include them does not undermine 
confidence in the outcome. Therefore, it does not warrant 
reversal. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (1994) ("Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded"); State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987) (an error does not warrant reversal 
unless it undermines the reviewing court's confidence in the 
outcome). 
At trial, the State played a tape of the conversation when 
defendant gave Mr. Barson the marijuana. See addendum B. During 
that conversation, defendant boasted about the quality of the 
marijuana and the low price for which he obtained it, asked Mr. 
Barson to give him some of the marijuana, and told Mr. Barson 
that he could get more (Tr. 189-92). On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked defendant what he meant when he said that the 
marijuana was "good F'in Bud" (Tr. 286). Defendant responded 
that this statement was a "sales pitch" (Tr. 286). These 
unchallenged statements from defendant rebutted any inference 
that defendant went through with the sale only as a result of Mr. 
16 
Barson's alleged pestering: typically, only a sales person uses 
sales pitches. The refusal to include instructions that would 
have required the jury to consider whether the sale resulted from 
defendant's own initiative and desire does not affect the outcome 
of the case because the jury would not likely have concluded 
otherwise. Therefore, it does not require reversal. 
Based on the above, the trial court's entrapment instruction 
does not constitute reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Zo1^ day of July, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
^ X ^ U A ^ $' U-<^^ 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
an oral prescription, that is not obtained within ten days of the date 
the prescription was written or authorized, may not be filled or dis-
pensed, 
(g) An order for a controlled substance in Schedules II through V for 
use by an inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from 
all requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is: 
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient and designates 
the quantity ordered; 
(ii) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by 
the prescriber affirming his authorization of the order within 48 
hours after filling or administering the order, and the patient's record 
reflects the quantity actually administered; and 
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession 
within the physical structure of the hospital, or the order is taken 
from a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount 
taken from the supply is administered directly to the patient autho-
rized to receive it, 
(8) No information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an at-
tempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled 
substance is considered to be a privileged communication. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, S 6; 1972, ch. 21, tions (l)(a) and (2), rewrote the introductory 
i 1; 1977, ch. 29, 5 5; 1979, ch. 12,I 4; 1980, paragraph of Subsection (3)(a), rewrote Subsec-
ch. 6, i 39; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, t 96; 1985, tion (3)(b), rewrote the introductory paragraph 
ch. 187, i 81; 1986, ch. 23, t 4; 1986, ch. 194,
 0f Subsection (4)(a), and rewrote Subsection 
f 13; 1987, ch. 92, f 99; 1987, ch. 161, fi 202; (5)(a) 
1989, ch. 225, t 61; 1989, ch. 253, ( 2; 1991, fTht 1 9 9 3 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
ch. 198, j 3; 1993, ch. 39, § 2. inserted "denied" and made punctuation 
Amendment Notes. - T h e 1991 amend- ^
 m S u b s e c t i o n ( 4 ) ( a ) ( i v ) . 
ment, effective April 29,1991, rewrote Subsec-
58-37*8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business a* 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect ttf 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place know-
ingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other person is 
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect 
to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confine-
ment shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any con-
trolled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all 
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or 
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through 
(2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a con-
trolled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not 
authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized 
by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be pun-
ished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are 
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chap-
ter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
tion or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly 
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
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(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself 
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to pre-
scribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or 
obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any con-
trolled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to 
disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, 
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or 
address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any ap-
plication, report, or other document required to be kept by this chap-
ter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, or-
der, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not au-
thorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, 
or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is 
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsec-
tion (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
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(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsec-
tion would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act oc-
curred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maxi-
mum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction autho-
rized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been con-
victed of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or 
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within 
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to V2 the maximum sentence imposed by 
law for the offense committed. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term •* 
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was con-
victed. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time 
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no even 
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later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the 
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a 
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allega-
tion of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his 
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the conse-
quences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of 
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Sub-
section (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or de-
nies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evi-
dence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous 
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was par-
doned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the 
evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant 
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing 
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, the defen-
dant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appro-
priate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion deter-
mines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b). 
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evi-
dence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
*&y person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
•Hall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 5 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
* 1; 1977, ch. 29, * 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, $ 1; 1986, ch. 196, 5 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 95, ft 1; 
1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch. 56, ft 1; 1989, ch. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, $ 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 161, effective April 23, 1990, in-
serted "to obtain a prescription for" and "or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving 
any controlled substance from another source" 
in Subsection (4XaXii) and corrected two refer-
ence errors in Subsection (13). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, ft 2, effec-
tive from April 23, 1990 until July 1, 1990, 
corrected reference errors in Subsections (9)(a) 
and (13Kb). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, J 3, effec-
tive July 1,1990, substituted "Section 77-18-1" 
for "Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure" in Subsection (9)(a). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 29, 1991, in Subsection (5)(a), inserted 
Subsection (ii), redesignated former Subsection 
(ii) as (iii), substituted "or institution under 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Admissibility of evidence. 
Arranging sale. 
Distribution. 
—Distribution for value. 
Evidence. 
Possession. 
—Amount. 
Search and seizure. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
In accord with bound volume. See State v. 
Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Subsection (5) does not violate a defendant's 
due process rights by imposing an enhanced 
penalty for violations that take place within 
1,000 feet of a school. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989). 
Subsection (5Kd), which eliminates lack of 
knowledge about the aggravating factor's pres-
ence as a defense for the enhanced penalty, 
does not violate due process. State v. Moore, 
782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
Subsection (5) does not violate equal protec-
tion on the ground that it treats drug dealers 
in small towns differently from those in large 
cities, since all defendants state-wide who dis-
tribute a controlied substance for value within 
Subsections (5)(aHi) and (ii)" for wUrui 
section (5)(a)(ir in Subsection (iij)t ?JJ 
Subsections (iv) through (vih), redesi 
former Subsections (iii) and (iv) as (ix) JJM 
and substituted "Subsections (5)(aXi) thi* 
(vhT for "Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii)" in Sub 
tion (ix); substituted "Chapter 37a, TitU 
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act or Chapter ' 
Title 58, Imitation Controlled Substances i 
for "Chapters 37a or 37b, Title 58" in Subj 
tion (13Xa); and added Subsection (14) (ap^ 
ing as Subsection (13) after January 1, X9< 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 198, effect 
April 29, 1991, substituted all of the pre* 
language after "Schedules II through V* 
Subsection UXaXiii) for "under an order or p 
scription," and made stylistic changes in \ 
introductory paragraph of Subsection (5xt 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 268, effects 
January 1, 1992, deleted former Subsecti 
(13), imposing a fee of $150 against each p< 
son convicted of, and each juvenile fom 
within the court's jurisdiction because of, coi 
mitting an offense and providing for the use 
funds generated by the fee. 
This section is set out as reconciled by tr 
Office of Legislative Research and Genen 
Counsel. 
1,000 feet of a public school are governed b] 
the statute and susceptible to its enhancet 
penalties. Stat* v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utal 
1989). 
The penalty enhancement provision of Sub-
section (5)(a)(iii) is not unconstitutional, since 
the distinction between simple possession of 
controlled substances and possession in prox-
imity to a school is a valid one, reasonably re-
lated to the legislative purpose of creating a 
drug-free environment around schoolchildren. 
State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
Admissibility of evidence. 
Evidence of defendant's possession of mari-
juana, similarly packaged, twelve days prior to 
the offense charged, was properly admitted, 
where the contested evidence was particularly 
probative on the issue of constructive posses-
sion and was illustrative of defendant's com-
mon plan of marijuana distribution. State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Arranging tale. 
The offense of arranging the distribution for 
value of a controlled substance does not require 
the actual distribution. All that is needed is 
the arrangement for such distribution, coupled 
with knowledge or intent. Evidence of an ac-
tual sale may be helpful, or even necessary, in 
proving knowledge or intent, but sale itself is 
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jury asserted defense of coercion where defen-
dant admitted his escape but claimed he did so 
because of trouble with the prison inmates 
caused by his failure to pay for broken radio. 
State v. Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353,393 P.2d 390 
(1964). 
To avail himself of the defense of compulsion 
due to threats of violence, a defendant in a trial 
for escape must present evidence that he was 
compelled to escape by threat of imminent vio-
lence which he could not have reasonably re-
sisted; for a threat to be imminent, it would 
have to appear that it had been communicated 
to the defendant that he would be subjected to 
physical force presently. State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1981). 
In the context of escape, the threat or use of 
unlawful physical force alleged in support of a 
compulsion defense must be at least that which 
would cause substantial bodily injury. State v. 
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986). 
-—Instructions. 
Trial court's instruction requiring that the 
threat of substantial bodily injury be specific 
was proper at defendant's trial for escape. 
State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986). 
Trial court properly instructed the jury that 
the duress defense was not available in re-
sponse to an escape charge unless there was no 
time for complaint to the authorities or a his-
tory of futile complaints. State v. Tuttle, 730 
P.2d 630 (Utah 1986). 
Trial court properly instructed the jury that 
duress would not be a defense to an escape 
charge unless the defendant reported to the au-
thorities immediately after the escape. State v. 
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986). 
Standard. 
Where record was replete with evidence that 
would sustain, if not compel, a finding that de-
fendant was not coerced or threatened with im-
mediate use of unlawful physical force when he 
aided and abetted in rape, there was no need to 
determine whether to use a subjective or objec-
tive standard as to defendant's perception of 
coercion or threat of force. State v. Alexander, 
597 P.2d 890 (Utah 1979). 
Defendant's claim of compulsion in prosecu-
tion for theft was rejected because the defen-
dant failed to demonstrate specific imminent 
threats and that there were no reasonable le-
gal alternatives to committing the crime. State 
v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law § 148. 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 49. 
A.L.R. — Coercion, compulsion, or duress as 
defense to charge of kidnapping, 69 A.L.R.4th 
1005. 
Construction and application of statutes jus-
tifying the use of force to prevent the use of 
force against another, 71 A.L.R.4th 940. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 38. 
76-2-303. Entrapment 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creat-
ing a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not other-
wise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threat-
ening bodily iiyury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is 
based on conduct causing or threatening the iryury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor 
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on 
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defen-
dant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made 
at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit 
a later filing. 
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(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall 
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at 
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be 
appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is 
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a 
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for 
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrap-
ment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-303, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-303. 
ANALYSIS 
Consent to police visits. 
Evidence of past offenses. 
Hearsay. 
Jury question. 
Nature of defense. 
Objective standard. 
Offense involving threat of injury. 
Officer's knowledge of defendant's identity. 
Providing opportunity to commit offense. 
Specific police conduct. 
—Persistent requests by officer. 
—Use of attractive female undercover officer. 
—Use of close friendship. 
Consent to police visits. 
Defendant was not entrapped for unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance 
where, although the police officer visited the 
defendant's office on several occasions, the 
visits were with defendant's invitation or con-
sent. State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 
1986). 
Evidence of past offenses. 
State is not permitted during its case in chief 
at trial to introduce into evidence past offenses 
committed by defendant where entrapment is 
an issue; however, state must be allowed to 
present any evidence in impeachment or rebut-
tal that would show defendant's disposition to 
commit the crime charged; the fact that this 
may include prior acts of crime or misconduct 
would not render such evidence inadmissible. 
State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978). 
Where defendant charged with attempted 
Jneft by receiving stolen property raised de-
fense of entrapment, it was reversible error to 
permit undercover police officer to testify on 
direct examination in state's case in chief as to 
Betters relating to defendant's previous trans-
ections relating to stolen property. State v. 
Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978). 
Hearsay. 
Excluded testimony offered, not to prove the 
truth of what informant said to defendants, but 
rather to show that informant made state-
ments that induced defendants to commit the 
offense should not have been excluded as hear-
say since truth of statements was irrelevant, 
the crucial factor being whether statements 
were made and whether they influenced the 
defendants' behavior. State v. Salmon, 612 
P.2d 366 (Utah 1980). 
Jury question. 
Where private citizen warned authorities 
that defendants were coming from California 
to Utah for purpose of robbing some Utah 
drugstores and thereafter drove the defendants 
around to various drugstores at their request 
and where government's conduct was limited 
to placing a listening device on the informant 
and tailing defendants until they carried out 
their preconceived intentions, entrapment was 
a factual question properly presented to the 
jury. State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366 (Utah 
1980). 
The question of entrapment was properly left 
to the jury, where an undercover police officer, 
who had reason to believe that defendant was 
involved in drug trafficking, asked defendant 
to sell him cocaine on four occasions over a 
forty-day period and, on the fourth contact, de-
fendant agreed to sell him cocaine, made ar-
rangements to pick it up, and sold him a gram. 
State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986). 
Nature of defense. 
Though it is sometimes said that entrapment 
is an affirmative defense, it is properly re-
garded as a factor tending to raise a reasonable 
doubt that defendant freely and voluntarily 
committed the offense charged; in determining 
the validity of an entrapment defense, the 
court must therefore consider (1) whether it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
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78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other iocal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
idges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
»view and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
iginal appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
hapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, * 46; 19S7, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, S 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Kb) and redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) 
through (k). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Scope. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus 
petition, in which defendant claimed only that 
his due process rights were violated at a hear-
ing before the parole board, lay to the Court of 
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the 
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals 
of first degree or capital felony convictions and 
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-
viction or sentence is challenged. Padiila v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 
1991). 
Scope. 
This statute does not authorize the Court of 
Appeals to review the orders of every adminis-
trative agency, but allows judicial review of 
agency decisions "when the legislature ex-
pressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Li-
censing, Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 542 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 176 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8 (1991). 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-4. 
78-3-11.5. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of 
cases to circuit court — Ap-
peals — Jurisdiction when 
circuit and district court 
merged. 
State District Court Adminis-
trative System. 
Section 
78-3-16.5. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-21.5. 
Repealed. 
Judicial Council — Creation — 
Members — Terms and elec-
tion — Responsibilities — Re-
ports. 
Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — 
Appeals — Jurisdiction when circuit and district 
court merged. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimi-
nal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed 
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of 
the district court in multiple judge districts or the district court judge in 
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upon the 
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When 
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings 
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced 
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association or relation to attorney in case, 65 Power of state trial court in criminal case to 
A.L.R.4th 73. change venue on its own motion, 74 A.L.R.4th 
Disqualification from criminal proceeding of 1023. 
trial judge who earlier presided over disposi- Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 115 to 
tion of case of coparticipant, 72 A.L.R.4th 651. 145. 
Rule 29A. Change of judge as a matter of right. 
(a) Notice of change. In any criminal action commenced after April 15, 
1992 in any district, circuit or justice court, all parties joined in the action 
may, by unanimous agreement and without cause, change the judge assigned 
to the action by filing a notice of change of judge. The parties shall send a copy 
of the notice to the assigned judge and the presiding judge. The notice shall be 
signed by all parties and shall state: (1) the name of the assigned judge; (2) the 
date on which the action was commenced; (3) that all parties joined in the 
action have agreed to the change; (4) that no other persons are expected to be 
named as parties; and (5) that a good faith effort has been made to serve all 
parties named in the pleadings. The notice shall not specify any reason for the 
change of judge. Under no circumstances shall more than one change of judge 
be allowed under this rule in any action. A change of judge under this rule is 
available only after a judge has been assigned to the case for trial. A notice of 
change may not be filed prior to or during a preliminary examination. 
(b) Time. The notice shall be filed no later than 7 days after notice of 
assignment or reassignment of judge. Failure to file a timely notice precludes 
any change of judge under this rule. 
(c) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a notice of change, the as-
signed judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge shall 
promptly determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the 
action. If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall 
promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether 
the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action. 
(d) Nondisclosure to court No party shall communicate to the court, or 
cause another to communicate to the court, the fact of any party's seeking 
consent to a notice of change. 
(e) Rule 29 unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights under Rule 29. 
(Added effective April 15, 1992; amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- Compiler's Notes. — In a minute entry 
ment, effective May 1, 1993, in Subdivision (b) dated January 21, 1993, the Utah Supreme 
substituted the first sentence for "In misde- Court provided that this rule, "originally 
meanor cases, the notice shall be filed no later adopted on an emergency basis effective April 
than 7 days after arraignment. In felony cases, 15, 1992, has now been published for public 
the notice shall be filed no later than 7 days comment. The Advisory Committee proposed 
after arraignment or notice of assignment of amendments to paragraph (b). Those amend-
judge, whichever occurs first." ments are adopted, effective May 1, 1993." 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
ubstantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
rrors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
le court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Cross-References. — Arraignment, neces- Indictments and informations, harmless 
;y of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10. errors, U.R.Cr.P. 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
mission of photographic evidence 
rical mistakes. 
>efendant's right of allocution. 
•mless error. 
lor defect. 
Substantial right affected. 
—State's burden of persuasion. 
Variances. 
Cited. 
Admission of Dhotn«n»o~i-*~ -
ADDENDUM B 
PAGE 189 
Ouch! Shit. Fuckin' dog. 
MR. SQUIRE: Ha-ha ha. 
MR. BARSON: Bit my—[INAUBIDLE] —off. 
MR. SQUIRE: That's right. 
Where's Linda? 
MR. BARSON: She's at home doin' some homework. 
{INAUDIBLE] 
Where do you want to go? 
MR. SQUIRE: Just up the—[INAUBIDLE]. 
{INAUDIBLE] 
MR. SQUIRE: Oh, you sure knew that dog. 
[INAUDIBLE] 
MR. BARSON: That's cool. 
[INAUDIBLE] 
How much did you get? 
MR. SQUIRE: [INAUDIBLE]—under a quarter. 
MR. BARSON: Under a quarter? 
[INAUDIBLE] 
MR. SQUIRE: You can smell it from here. 
MR. BARSON: Holy shit. Yeah, it is. It's 
fuckin' good, man. 
MR. SQUIRE: It's good fuckin' Bud, dude. 
MR. BARSON: Is it? Do you use it? 
MR. SQUIRE: Huh? 
MR. BARSON: Do you use it? 
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1 MR. SQUIRE: One bowl u/ith that, dude, is 
2 w h a t — [INAUDIBLE ] — 
3 MR. BARSON: All right, man. Thanks a lot. 
4 MR. SQUIRE: That look good? 
5 MR. BARSON: Looks better than that other crap we 
6 got. 
7 MR. SQUIRE: [INAUDIBLE] For 50 bucks, that aint 
8 fuckin'. I got a good deal, dude. 
9 MR. BARSON: Yeah, you did. 
10 MR. SQUIRE: Turn your dome light up. 
11 M a y b e — [ I N A U D I B L E ] . See, it's all buds. 
12 MR. BARSON: Holy cow! All buds, huh? That 
13 smells good. All right. 
14 MR. SQUIRE: Let me have a bowl out of it for 
15 goin' and gettin' it for you. 
16 MR. BARSON: Go ahead and take a pinch. 
17 MR. SQUIRE: [INAUDIBLE]—yeah, that's a good buy, 
18 MR. BARSON: Thanks a lot, man. 
19 MR. SQUIRE: Yeah. 
20 MR. BARSON: Kind of hard there. 
2i MR. SQUIRE: A little bud? 
22 MR. BARSON: Yeah. That's cool. 
23 MR. SQUIRE: [INAUDIBLE] 
24 MR. BARSON: Bud. All right. We'll run you back, 
25 MR. SQUIRE: Fuckin' it's a good bud, dude. 
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1 MR. BARSON: [INAUDIBLE]—it's done. I 
2 should—[INAUDIBLE]—we got s o m e — 
3 MR. SQUIRE: Don't smoke it without me. Ha-ha 
4 ha-ha ha. 
5 MR. BARSON: All right. 
6 MR. SQUIRE: I was just givin' you shit. Fuck, 
7 smoke till your heart's content. I need to get more. 
8 II MR. BARSON: Can you? 
9 MR. SQUIRE: Yeah. Any time I want to. 
10 MR. BARSON: How much in a quarter—[INAUDIBLE]? 
11 MR. SQUIRE: A quarter? 
12 MR. BARSON: Yeah. W h a t ' s — 
13 MR. SQUIRE: 80, but it's a lot bigger than that. 
14 MR. BARSON: 80 bucks? 
15 MR. SQUIRE: Yeah. 
16 MR. BARSON: All right. [INAUDIBLE] 
17 MR. SQUIRE: See, this—and I really didn't know 
18 that's why it cost so much when I got up there. 
19 [INAUDIBLE]—bad shit from it, you know? 
20 MR. BARSON: Yeah. 
21 MR. SQUIRE: I left a few other bags—[INAUDIBLE]. 
22 MR. BARSON: [INAUDIBLE] 
23 Are you goin' next week? 
24 MR. SQUIRE: Yeah. I'd like to. 
25 MR. BARSON: All right. We're plannin' on it now. 
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MR. SQUIRE: Fuck, I got to go to u/ork tomorrow 
and the next day. 
MR. BARSON? All right. And you know—he's got my 
number, so just give me a call. 
MR. SQUIRE: Okay. 
MR. BARSON: Okay. 
MR. SQUIRE: You bet. 
MR. BARSON: 6268, man. 
MR. SQUIRE: 6268? 
MR. BARSON: Yeah. 
MR. SQUIRE: All right. 
MR. BARSON: See ya. Thanks.' 
[INAUDIBLE, WHEREUPON MR. COX STOPPED PLAYING THE 
SECOND TAPED CONVERSATION] 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, the tape wasn't finished. 
THE COURT: It wasn't finished? 
MR. BERRY: No. And I'd like the jury to hear the 
last remark on this tape, of the confidential informant, if 
they're gonna hear it. 
[WHEREUPON MR. COX STARTED TAPE AGAIN AS FOLLOWS. J 
SECOND TAPED CONVERSATION CONTINUED 
•MR. BARSON: Shiah!" 
[WHEREUPON MR. COX STOPPED THE TAPE] 
MR. BLACKHAM: We offer 2 and 3, Your Honor. 
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WITNESS: A Umf I gave him the money back 
for that. 
1 Q You gave Brian money back? 
A Yes. I did. 
2 Q How much? 
A I can't remember. 
3 Q Okay. Did you—what did you mean u/hen you saidf 
•This is good F'in' Bud." 
A Sales pitch. 
4 Q Sales pitch? 
A Yeah. 
5 Q What do you mean a "sales pitch"? 
A It u/as because I told him that I could get it for 
him— 
6 Q Okay. 
A —that earlier that day. 
7 Q What do you mean u/hen you told him it looked 
good. 
A What? 
8 Q What did you mean u/hen you told Brian the stuff 
looked good? 
A Well, from u/hat I knew of itf it looked like it 
u/as alright. 
9 Q Okay. Did you ask him if he would let you have a 
bou/l ? 
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an error that may cause a mistrial. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Let's discuss it. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen I'd like you to 
go into the Jury Room in just a moment. But I admonish you 
again, don't talk about this case with anyone. 
(WHEREUPON JURY WENT TO THE JURY ROOM] 
PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE THE JURY 
THE COURT: Close the door. Sheriff. 
[BAILIFF RESPONDED AND CLOSED COURTROOM DOOR] 
MR. BERRY: Mr. Squires was convicted— 
THE COURT: For the purpose of the record, this 
conversation is now taking place outside the presence of the 
jury. 
All right. Go ahead. 
MR. BERRY: Mr. Squires was convicted of 
possession of marijuana, of a controlled substance. 
MR. BLACKHAM: That's not correct, counsel. Let's 
get it correct. He was convicted of attempted distribution 
of a controlled substance. 
MR. BERRY: I'll just take a look. 
(MR. BLACKHAM HANDED DOCUMENT TO Mh. BERRY] 
THE COURT: What is that? A Class-A? 
MR. BERRY: A Class-A Misdemeanor. 
Obviously, the statute says that he can't ask 
about anything, other than felonies. 
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MR. BLACKHAM: I want to address that, too, Your 
Honor. But let's finish here. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Well, obviously what he's getting 
at here is he doesn't want me to pursue about the urinalysis 
test that Mr. Squire volunteered. He questioned him about 
it; he answered it, Your Honor, and I want to pursue the 
urinalysis test. And obviously, why he's on urinalysis test 
is that's required by his Probation Officer. 
They brought it up, Your Honor, and I'm entitled 
to pursue it. And I want the Court—in fact, I'm gonna flat 
out ask him. Your Honor, about this conviction. And I want 
the Court to read. 
(INDICATED] 
I've got a case right on point— 
THE COURT: Let me see the case. 
MR. BLACKHAM: —on this issue that I'm entitled 
to ask this question: State vs. Hansen. 
[HANDED DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND COURT EXAMINED 
SAME] 
MR. BERRY: I'd like to take a look at that, too. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Here, your copy, counsel. 
(HANDED COPY TO MR. BERRY AND MR. BERRY CONFERRED 
WITH HIS CLIENT] 
THE COURT: Do you want to look at this, counsel? 
PAGE 272 
MR. BERRY: I have a copy of the case. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: May I see the the conviction 
statement. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Yes, Your Honor. 
[MR. BLACKHAM HANDED COPY OF STATEMENT TO COURT] 
THE COURT , Ml right. Have you had a chance to 
look it over? 
MR. BERRY 1 have read 1 tie case 
THE COURT A H right. Ill hear you, if you want 
to talk any more about i.. 
MR. BERRY: I wc n i l < :! II ike t A : > :•."'. 
think that there are later cases that are 
directly on point, as well. 1 think that this case that Mr. 
Bldi.kliani has produced heie Is «in e<iif!v case, a 1978 case, 
that the statute specifically prohibits Mr. Blackham from 
addressing any offenses, other than felonies, and 1 .hat t; .his 
case focuses on a subject ve intent of the defendant here. 
Now that has been changed by our Supreme Court. In the 
early Ron & Chapman it was subjective intent of the 
defendant that was important, Btit Ihe entrapment defense, 
by virtue of later decisions of our Supreme Court— 
THE COURT: Well, do yon have MIII, , rounst'l? 
Specifically show them, to me. 
MR. BERRY: i have several cases. 
THE COURT: J u s t po in t oiiiiii utici'i1, so i clou i h a v e 
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to sit and read all of them- Point out where you want me to 
read. 
MR. BERRY: The—was this case shepherdized? 
MR. BLACKHAM: Yes, Your Honor. And I'm not 
arguing about the subjective intent issue. My point here is 
what I'm allowed to bring up in the way of rebuttal to an 
entrapment defense and Hansen says I am entitled. 
I can't do it on direct, and the Supreme Court 
reversed this case. They did it on direct. But on 
rebuttal, Your Honor, for rebuttal evidence, I am allowed to 
do it to rebut entrapment, and Hansen is right on point on 
that issue, Your Honor. 
MR. BERRY: Well, I don't think he's testified to 
anything that would even open the door here. 
THE COURT: Well, he has testified to this. 
Of course, it doesn't appear to me like it makes 
any difference, because you're using the defense of 
entrapment and that alone would make it possible for him to 
bring it in. But in this case he's testified that besides 
that, he's been taking these urinalysis—was it urinalysis 
tests? 
MR. BERRY: He has. And he's on probation. But 
he didn't testify to the probation. 
THE COURT: Well, I know. But he's saying, 'Don't 
convict me. I've been taking these urinalysis tests and 
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that shou/s that clean \sn that t-ie purpose? 
ThaL & Liie purpose I got ot it of hi s *«--rimony. 
Nou/ M r . B l a c k h a m s a y s , "All right. If tl lat shou/s you're 
clean, why are you taking the urinalysis test?1 
MR. BERRV i Hi" a l s o t e s t i f i e d M i a l Ii**'" i ? u s n d 
marijuana before and stopped using it; and he didn't testify 
that he was getting urinalysis testing in a probation 
agreemei it enter ed ii 11:c:> by tit le Cot 11 1: because I ne was convicted 
of a crime. 
THE COURT: Well, go ahead. Anything else? 
MR. BLACKHAM: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mi, Berry? 
Something in those cases that would show me? 
• I wish you would Have* you got. the rules of 
evidence thereupon which this is based? I'd like to see 
thai rule. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Yes, Your Honor. They cite the 
statute, of course, the entrapment statute. But they also 
cite wl :ta1: is i loit • R u l e 4 0 4 , 
THE COURT: That's what I wanted to look at 
MR. BLACKHAM: And it's under (b} that they cite 
t h i s , Html this Is hi M I n fi upei ti'UPbt ion under 4lM» Y o u r 
Honor, where this is also a knowledge of intent Where this 
is a knowledge, Your Honor, where this is entrapment. 
(COURT REVIEWED RULE 404] 
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MR. BERRY: I'm missing. Where are you reading 
there, Ross? 
MR. BLACKHAM: 404. 
MR. BERRY: (b)? 
MR. BLACKHAM: 404(b). other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts. And this case cites statute is supporting it. It's 
ruling that the prosecution is allowed to ask questions like 
this to rebut entrapment. 
MR. BERRY: Of course, that's 404(b) states that 
they1re not admissible. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Unless— 
MR. BERRY: It doesn't say -unless". 
MR. BLACKHAM: Oh, yeah, it does, too. 
MR. BERRY: It may however be admissible to other 
purposes. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Yeah, such as intent, knowledge, 
motive, and specifically what's the issue in this case is 
his intent. The Hansen case cites that rule in support of 
their decision. 
MR. BERRY: I think that is the whole approach 
here obviates the purpose. I think it's highly prejudicial 
to the jury. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. BLACKHAM: No, Your Honor. 
MR. BERRY: I'd cite the case of State of Utah 
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vs. Ronalu t, Wriaht. 744 PACIFIC IIf 315 Utah Appellate 
Court 1987: •Character—f v*. t states, and I1!! i>»ad ii 
•Character of the suspect predis to commit the 
offense and subjective intent ~'t irrelevant ••• determine 
u/hether the police entrapped the suspect 
conduct creates the substantial i l^ i\
 p than a normal law 
bidir i u/ould be induced to commit the crime, 
entrapment has occurred." 
Also, State vs. Belt, 780 PACIFIC IIf 1271f a 
1989 Utttfi case. The objective for the test determining 
u/hether defendant has been entrapped is u/hether the police 
conduct used In ohtainjny evidence of the commission of the 
offense produced pursuasion." 
THE COURT: Well, J aaree wild that, but that \ 
isn'L ase. 
MR. BERRY hink that's u/hat he's imnbinw on 
here is Mr. Squire'b I jiist cited a case that says 
it's i iot eves \ f ertinent in an entrapment defense. 
THE COURT: Well, do you have anvt IIJUM else? . •'•'• 
MR. BLACKHAM: Honor. 
MR., BERRY: I might have one moment. 
[CHECKED NOTES] 
MR. BERRY: I t)r i U W Y that if the jury heard the 
evidence ol I his prior conviction, that it would be highly 
prejudicial of Mr. Squire. 
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THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allou/ the jury to 
hear it. I think you've opened the door up. Mr. Squire 
opened the door with his statement. And also, I think that 
this case controls in the State vs. Hansen 
588 PACIFIC II, 164, and authorize that you bring the jury 
back in. 
[BAILIFF RESPONDED AND BROUGHT THE JURY BACK IN] 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT 
THE COURT: The record should indicate the jury is 
back in the jury box. 
You may ask your next question. 
CROSS EXAMINATION CONTINUED 
BY MR. BLACKHAM: Yes. 
1 Q Mr. Squire, I u/as asking you about your statement 
about taking urinalysis tests; do you recall that? 
A Yes, I do. 
2 Q What is a urinalysis test? 
A It's a test where I go in to a Parole—Probation 
Officer and he gives me a test. 
3 Q Are you currently taking those tests? 
A Ura, I haven't for a few months• 
4 Q Okay, You say it's when you go in to a Parole or 
a Probation Officer and he asks you to take a test; correct? 
A Yes. 
5 Q Do you currently have a Parole or a Probation 
